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INTRODUCTION 
“The American story,” Bush said, was “a story of flawed and fallible 
people, united across the generations by grand and enduring ideals.” 
“We are not this story’s author, who fills time and eternity with His 
purpose,” the president continued. “Never tiring, never yielding, never 
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finishing, we renew that purpose today, to make our country more just 
and generous, to affirm the dignity of our lives and every life.” 
President George W. Bush, Jan. 20, 20011 
Throughout the years, the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay has 
witnessed an abundance of intriguing linguistic words and phrases. For 
example, “Freedom Vanilla” replaced French Vanilla ice cream in the 
mess hall,2 and the area where journalists and others were often 
sequestered during their visits to the base was re-named “Camp Justice.”3 
The list goes on. However, the language that has had the most significant 
impact throughout the years has been the words and phrases used in the 
administration of justice regarding the detainees being held on terrorism 
charges. 
Wall St. Journal Supreme Court reporter Jess Bravin’s book, The 
Terror Courts: Rough Justice at Guantanamo Bay, thoroughly 
chronicles how the use of military commissions came about for the first 
time since the Second World War, and pointedly demonstrates the 
abundance of problems they faced once established. In addition to telling 
the story of Marine Corps lieutenant colonel Stuart Couch, an earnest 
military prosecutor who later becomes exhaustively disenchanted with 
the commissions, the book chronicles the new linguistic frontiers in the 
American legal community. In particular, the disturbing treatment of 
detainees and the hasty establishment of the commissions significantly 
troubled the process, leading to numerous problems that the 
commissions still face today, more than a decade after their 
establishment. 
Noting in his first inaugural address that it was “a time of blessing,” 
President George W. Bush stated that he would “bring the values of our 
history to the care of our times,” and that he would confront the nation’s 
problems “instead of passing them on to future generations.”4 Though it 
may have been inaugural rhetoric, these phrases are a far cry from the 
language and policies employed under the administration. This is 
especially true in the context of the “war on terror.”5 As Bravin declares 
approximately a third of the way into his book: 
“The Bush administration . . . acted as though 9/11 had forever 
changed the constitutional order, creating a permanent state of 
emergency where legislative and judicial powers must yield to 
executive policy decisions. Even so, the administration insisted there 
was no risk to human rights, because its secret policies were consistent 
 
 1. Jess Bravin, The Terror Courts: Rough Justice at Guantanamo Bay 16 (2013). 
 2. Id. at 218. 
 3. Id. at 317. 
 4. Bravin, supra note 1, at 16. 
 5. Howard Ball, Bush, the Detainees, and the Constitution: The Battle over Presidential 
Power in the War on Terror (2007); see generally Joseph Margulies, Guantanamo and the Abuse 
of Presidential Power (2006). 
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with legal obligations and American traditions.”6 
This book review analyzes how particular language used throughout 
the establishment and execution of the commissions differed from 
American legal traditions and proactively disrupted the job of 
commission officials, prosecutors and defense attorneys. In particular, it 
focuses on four linguistic changes that had considerable influence: (1) 
From Due Process to “Full and Fair”; (2) From Classified to “Protected”; 
(3) From Custodial Interrogation to “Enhanced Interrogation”; and (4) 
From Acts of Terrorism to “Material Support for Terrorism.” These 
phrases consistently usurped traditional American legal language found 
in the Constitution, Acts of Congress, ratified treaties (such as the 
Geneva Conventions), and led the commissions down a perilous path of 
ambiguity. 
I.  FROM DUE PROCESS TO “FULL AND FAIR” 
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”7 Bush’s November 
13, 2001 Military Order fell significantly short of this standard, noting 
that the commissions will “at a minimum provide . . . a full and fair trial, 
with the military commission sitting as the triers of both fact and law.”8 
Bravin’s text, which spans more than a decade, emphasizes that the 
meaning of “full and fair” was never fully realized. It was not defined in 
the 2001 Military Order, and much of the confusion between the 
members of the Prosecutor’s Office that Stuart Couch works for is 
attempting to determine what exactly the phrase means. 
Analyzing the evolution of Bush’s Military Order, Bravin notes that 
an almost complete “draft declared it ‘not practicable’ for military 
commissions to follow ‘the principles of law and the rules of evidence’ 
that defined American justice.”9 Additionally, the document “made no 
reference to basic elements of due process – proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, presumption of innocence, the right to remain silent. The only 
standard was that evidence hold ‘probative value to a reasonable 
person.’”10 After seeing the draft Order, a group of top Judge Advocate 
Generals reacted in “disbelief,” and one noted that the document was 
“insane.”11 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Vice President Cheney may have been most 
forthright in terms of how the “full and fair” commissions developed, 
 
 6. Bravin, supra note 1, at 168. 
 7. U.S. Const. amend. V. 
 8. Military Order —Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 1665 (Nov. 13, 2001) (emphasis added). 
 9. Bravin, supra note 1, at 39. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 39. 
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noting that prisoners “will have a fair trial, but it will be under the 
procedures of a military tribunal, under rules of and regulations to be 
established in connection with that . . . . We think it guarantees that we’ll 
have the kind of treatment of these individuals that we believe they 
deserve.”12 Given the evolution of the commissions and the treatment of 
Guantanamo detainees, one assumes that the former Vice President 
accurately expressed the Administration’s perspective on the trials. 
After much confusion, wasted time, and squandered resources, 
Stuart Couch drafted a list of prosecution standards which could have 
guided standards for “full and fair” trials in order to protect due process 
concerns. These included not pursuing “Special Project” detainees that 
have been subjected to enhanced interrogation unless all documents 
regarding the interrogation were released, and providing defense counsel 
classified and unclassified materials. The proposed standards were 
largely ignored.13 
One voice that administration and commission officials could not 
ignore was John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld.14 Stevens declared that the commissions in their current form 
violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) and the 
Geneva Conventions. Stevens further noted that “Common Article 3, 
then, is applicable here and as indicated above, requires that Hamdan be 
tried by a ‘regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees 
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.’”15 
Subsequent to this ruling, however, Congress passed the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006,16 which stipulated that commissions’ 
procedures would proceed according to UCMJ regulations. Yet, the Act 
also stated that no defendants could “invoke the Geneva Conventions as 
a source of rights.”17 Additionally, because of the problems associated 
with the “full and fair” procedures that were already being administered, 
the Act deemed inapplicable the speedy trial,18 compulsory self-
incrimination,19 and investigation20 sections of the UCMJ. 
Ultimately, the “full and fair” standard deviated so far from 
traditional American justice that its meaning never fully materialized, 
and the phrase provided numerous problems for prosecutors in their 
early attempts to try the Guantanamo detainees. 
 
 12. Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 
 13. Id. at 159-61. 
 14. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 15. Id. at 631-32. 
 16. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
 17. Id. § 948(b)(g). 
 18. UCMJ art. 10, 10 U.S.C. § 810 (2006). 
 19. Id. § 831 
 20. Id. § 832 
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II.  FROM CLASSIFIED TO “PROTECTED” 
One of the major barriers in assessing whether there was “reason to 
believe” that an individual should be prosecuted was a new classification 
designed to withhold evidence. While governmental information has a 
well-established system in terms of categorizing classified and 
unclassified materials, Commissions’ authorities added an additional 
status category to unclassified information that they wanted suppressed.21 
Bravin writes that the commissions added the “protected” status but 
provided no definition for the term,22 therefore complicating matters for 
those individuals involved in and reporting on the commissions. 
Although Bush’s Military Order mentioned Clinton’s Executive 
Order regarding classified national security information, administration 
officials did not seem to abide by the “uniform system for classifying, 
safeguarding, and declassifying national security information” that the 
document provided.23 During a Pentagon briefing, appointing authority 
of commissions, John Altenburg attempted to shed some light on the 
intricacies of the term, stating, “I try to draw a balance – Should I release 
this name? Should I allow this to be public? Should we put this up on the 
website? When I analyze and I see that there are national security 
interests or potential intelligence issues, I’m inclined to err on the side of 
being careful.”24 This explanation hardly explains the differences in 
thought processes, let alone the differences in official administrative 
standards regarding what constitutes “classified” versus “protected.” 
The new classification caused particular problems with journalists 
that were covering the commissions, including Bravin. Journalists viewed 
the video feed of the trials on a five-minute delay, so that nothing 
“protected” would slip out. However, for those privileged reporters that 
acquired seats inside the courtroom, officials noted that if any 
“protected” information was revealed, “soldiers would seize [the 
journalists’] notebooks, read them for proscribed information, and tear 
out the offending pages.” Photocopies of seized pages would later be 
returned with the “protected” information blackened out. 
The Order went even further in prohibiting “protected” evidence 
from being seen by defendants or their attorneys. In a stirring reminder 
of how this differed from traditional American legal values, Bravin 
quotes Presiding Officer of Commissions Col. Pete Brownback asking 
defendant al-Bahlul: “Do you realize that because – well, that in 
accordance with the president’s Military Order and Military Commission 
Order No. 1, there may be evidence against you which you would not be 
 
 21. Bravin, supra note 1, at 183, 199. 
 22. Id. at 183. 
 23. Exec. Order No. 12958 — Classified National Security Information, 60 Fed. Reg. 634 (April 
17, 1995). 
 24. Bravin, supra note 1, at 183. 
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allowed to see because of its protected nature?”25 These words would 
likely never be uttered inside an American courtroom. Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld attempted to remedy this situation, noting that it is an 
indisputable part of customary international law26 that the accused must 
“be privy to the evidence against him.”27 As noted above, however, the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 deemed the investigation section of 
UCMJ inapplicable. 
In all, the introduction of the “protected” classification further 
muddled the commission’s process, especially with regard to journalists 
and defendants. 
III.  FROM CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION TO “ENHANCED 
INTERROGATION” 
Custodial interrogation procedures are some of the most litigated, 
adjudicated and sophisticated aspects of America’s criminal justice 
system, designed to protect defendant rights and allow interrogators to 
lawfully, although at times questionably, obtain information. 
Interrogation practices among U.S. police forces continue to have their 
problems, but the vast majority of these difficulties revolve around 
deception, not physical abuse or torture.28 Two Supreme Court cases, one 
of them over a century old, virtually eliminated the practice of physical 
torture during custodial interrogation: the 1884 case of Hopt. v. Utah29 
and the 1936 case of Brown v. Mississippi.30 Even where physical abuse 
was not a concern, the Supreme Court ruled in Chambers v. Florida that 
“persistent questioning and ‘other ingenious forms of entrapment’ could 
constitute compulsion.”31 Nevertheless, interrogation practices under the 
commissions radically diverged from traditional custodial practices. 
Bravin notes that early on the administration attempted to present a 
rosy picture of detainees’ treatment, stating that “[o]fficials insisted that 
treatment of prisoners was ‘humane’ and ‘consistent with’ Geneva 
 
 25. Id. at 199. 
 26. This references obligations arising from established state practices, as opposed to formal 
international treaties. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006) Stevens goes on to note that: 
Many of these are described in Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, adopted in 
1977 (Protocol I). Although the United States declined to ratify Protocol I, its objections were not to 
Article 75 thereof. Indeed, it appears that the Government “regard[s] the provisions of Article 75 as 
an articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy are entitled.” Taft, The 
Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 Yale J. Int.l L. 319, 322 (2003). Among 
the rights set forth in Article 75 is the “right to be tried in [one.s] presence.” Protocol I, Art. 
75(4)(e). 
 27. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 634. 
 28. Irina Khasin, Honesty Is the Best Policy: A Case for the Limitation of Deceptive Police 
Interrogation Practices in the United States, 42(3) Vand. J. Transnat’l. L. 1029, 1043-1049 (2009). 
 29. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). 
 30. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
 31. Khasin, supra note 27, at 1044. 
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conventions. In June 2003, President Bush underscored those claims with 
a statement marking the United Nations International Day in Support of 
Victims of Torture.”32 Additionally, Bravin reports that “Jim Haynes, 
responding to a query from Senator Patrick Leahy, sent a letter stating 
that the United States conducted interrogations ‘consistent with’ the 
Convention Against Torture and its implementing legislation.”33 
However, John Yoo, now a professor of law at the University of 
California, Berkeley Law School, wrote a confidential Office of Legal 
Counsel opinion noting that federal law banning torture did not apply to 
suspected terrorists,34 and Rumsfeld himself signed off on “special 
interrogation plans.”35During these sessions, interrogators often used a 
set of Army “approaches” including: “incentive”, “Fear-Down,” “Fear 
Up,” and “Pride and Ego Down.”36 Bravin also cites “[a]dditional ‘tactics 
to induce control, dependence, compliance, and cooperation’ [that] 
included ‘isolation/solitary confinement,’ ‘degradation,’ ‘sensory 
deprivation,’ ‘manipulation of diet,’ ‘disruption of sleep and biorhythms,’ 
and ‘sensory overload.”37 These tactics are far beyond practices that 
occur in traditional custodial interrogations, and as far as prisoners of 
war are concerned, such practices have been banned since the U.S. 
signed the Geneva Conventions in 1949 and formally ratified them in 
1955.38 
Some suspects wished that their captors turned them over to the 
United States, presumably based on the traditional American protections 
afforded to defendants and the United States’ record of abiding by the 
Geneva conventions. In fact, Bravin asserts that this was Mohamedou 
Ould Slahi’s wish.39 Yet after Slahi completed a disturbing stint in Jordan, 
he had no idea what was in store for him as the US was adapting to its 
novel “rough justice” standards. Bravin states that his “enhanced 
interrogation” techniques included the following: 
“Slahi was forced to stand, stripped naked, bent over; his anal cavity 
was searched. He was beaten – medical records later recorded ‘rib 
contusions’ as well as bruises and cuts to his lip and head – placed in 
 
 32. Bravin, supra note 1, at 81. 
 33. Id. at 82. Yet over time these assertions would prove false. A recent report by a non-partisan 
commission noted that the United States “indisputabl[y]…engaged in the practice of torture” at 
Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, Iraq and other areas. Constitution Project, The Report of the 
Constitution Project’s Task Force on Detainee Treatment, pp.1-8 (2013), available at 
http://detaineetaskforce.org/pdf/Full-Report.pdf. 
 34. Bravin, supra note 1, at 92. This memorandum remains classified, but is referenced in other 
memorandums. 
 35. Id. at 105, 257. 
 36. Id. at 88-89. 
 37. Id. at 92. 
 38. Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Aug. 12, 1949 (ratified Aug. 30, 1955), 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
 39. Bravin, supra note 1, at 101. 
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isolation, subjected to temperature extremes, including a room called 
the ‘freezer.’ He would be accused of breaking rules, of hiding things in 
his cell, then insulted and disciplined again. The ‘interrogation team 
will make detainee feel psychologically uncomfortable, emotionally 
uncomfortable, assert superiority over detainee, escalate stress, play 
loud music, and continue to condition detainee to menial tasks,’ the 
plan said.”40 
The label of “enhanced interrogation” framed the issue in such a 
way that established principles of justice were shunned and gaining 
information, any information, was supported. Additionally, the phrase 
undermined the legitimacy of the military commissions and its ability to 
prosecute many of the Guantanamo Bay detainees. Its common use by 
administration officials further demonstrates how the traditional values 
of the American justice system, giving due respect for defendants’ rights 
and the protections of the Geneva Conventions, were routinely swept 
aside. 
IV.  FROM ACTS OF TERRORISM TO “MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR 
TERRORISM” 
The United States encountered numerous acts of terrorism before 
September 11, 2001, even at the hands of al-Qaeda.41 Indeed, crimes 
regarding terrorism and specific acts of terrorism were already present in 
American law.42 However, since Guantanamo largely housed “the 
butcher[s], the baker[s] and the candlestick maker[s]”43 of 9/11 and those 
found on the battlefields of Afghanistan, established law provided little 
recourse for prosecuting such defendants. The Military Commissions Act 
of 2006 somewhat alleviated that problem, stipulating a novel terrorism-
related crime: “providing material support for terrorism.”44 The inclusion 
of this offense in the Act was essential, because Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
found that “conspiracy” was not included in any congressional Act and 
was not recognized under international law.45 The 2006 Act remedied this 
situation for a spell and eventually Australian David Hicks, in addition to 
Hamdan, were convicted of this crime. 
When attempting to convict and sentence defendants, however, the 
phrase was not just used as a defined crime or offense that juries may 
consider, but as a prominent slogan for prosecutors. Bravin notes that 
 
 40. Id. at 105. 
 41. Examples include the first World Trade Center bombing on February 26, 1993, the August 
1998 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the USS Cole bombing on October 12, 2000. 
 42. See 18 U.S.C. 113B (2000); see also, the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act 
of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-222; Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-298; 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132. 
 43. Bravin, supra note 1, at 128. 
 44. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, § 950v(b)(25). 
 45. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 563 (2006). 
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during Hamdan’s sentencing hearing, prosecutor John Murphy 
repeatedly stated the phrase “material support for terrorism” in his 
closing argument. In fact, he used it over twelve times (that the text 
documents) and Bravin states that he emphasized the word “terrorism” 
over “material support.”46 At one point prosecutor Murphy stated, “His 
material support of terrorism has changed our world as we knew it. They 
changed it dramatically in our lifetime and perhaps changed it 
forever . . . . Think of the victims of his material support for terrorism 
and their families, living each day without loved ones, and their 
photographs that are forever changed.”47 Additionally, one of his final 
statements to the sentencing panel in Mr. Hamdan’s case was “[t]ake one 
second, just one second, and think about the victims of Hamdam’s 
material support for terrorism . . . . Please, do justice for all the victims of 
material support for terrorism in this case.”48 
Although Murphy asked for a life sentence, the panel gave Hamdan 
a sentence of five months and eight days, including time already served. 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals eventually vacated Hamdan’s 
conviction based on the fact that “material support for terrorism,” as 
defined in the 2006 Act, could not retroactively apply to Mr. Hamdan’s 
actions.49 The ruling potentially brought into question some of the other 
defendants that have been tried or convicted under the charge of 
“material support for terrorism,” such as the above-mentioned David 
Hicks, an Australian citizen who was caught among Taliban fighters in 
Afghanistan 2001, pled guilty in 2007, and was subsequently repatriated 
to Australia.50 
Though “providing material support for terrorism” still stands as a 
crime by which new offenders can be convicted, the novel phrase 
nevertheless provided many difficulties for the Guantanamo Bay 
commissions, and especially for some of the early trials. 
CONCLUSION 
The Terror Courts, in addition to being an engaging and 
thoroughly researched text, is a valuable demonstration of what can 
happen when traditional notions of American justice are replaced with 
ill-conceived, ad hoc legal phraseology. It is also a reminder that the 
language of current and future administrations should be monitored to 
ensure that we do not stray from the traditional and constitutionally 
appropriate legal values we have developed as a nation. For example, in 
 
 46. Bravin, supra note 1, at 337. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 338. 
 49. Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Bravin, supra note 2, at 378. 
 50. However, the charge itself was upheld in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 
(2010). 
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a recent letter by Eric Holder to Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick 
Leahy on the killing of American citizens using drones,51 Mr. Holder 
stated that it was “clear and logical that United States citizenship alone 
does not make individuals immune from being targeted.”52 Yet, what is 
“clear and logical” to Mr. Holder may not be so to other members of 
Congress and to other legal scholars. 
Rather than “bring[ing] the values of our history to the care of our 
times,” the Bush administration set their own course regarding the 
administration of justice and the linguistic phrases they concocted for the 
military commissions at Guantanamo Bay. Some of this phrasing has 
been altered or rendered obsolete because of court opinions and a 
change in administration. Yet, some of it remains. The introduction of 
these novel terms into the administration of justice made it significantly 
more difficult to try and convict detainees. The linguistic acrobatics 
further transformed the commissions into a charade, threatening the 
legitimacy not only of the commissions themselves but of the United 
States’ competency to deal with suspected terrorists and the larger “war 
on terror.” Ultimately, the pioneering language transformed traditional 
notions of American justice into “rough justice.” 
 
 
 51. Letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick 
Leahy (May 22, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/slideshow/AG-letter-5-22-13.pdf. 
 52. Id. at para. 5. 
